Reparations for indigenous peoples in two selected latin american countries by M. Rosti
13
Reparations for Indigenous Peoples 
in Two Selected Latin 
American Countries
Marzia Rosti*
1. Argentina
a) Indigenous populations in Argentina in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries
Argentina’s 1994 constitutional reform introduced sentence 17 into Art 75 of its 
Constitution, according to which:
[c]orresponde al Congreso . . . reconocer la preexistencia étnica y cultural de los pueblos 
indígenas argentinos. Garantizar el respeto a su identidad y derecho a una educación 
bilingüe e intercultural; reconocer la personería jurídica de sus comunidades, y la 
posesión y propriedad comunitarias de las tierras que tradicionalmente ocupan; y regu-
lar la entrega de otras aptas y suﬁ cientes para el desarrollo humano; ninguna de ellas será 
enajenable, trasmisible ni susceptible de gravámenes y embargos. Asegurar su partici-
pación en la gestión referida a sus recursos naturales y a los demás intereses que los afecten. 
Las provincias pueden ejercer concurrentemente estas atribuciones’.¹
Th is provision was the result of the Argentina’s desire to break down the tenden-
cies of assimilation and cultural homogenization promoted in the second half 
of the nineteenth century with the purpose of building a homogeneous white 
* Researcher in the Philosophy of Law at the University of Milan, where she teaches the Culture 
of Spanish-speaking countries. Th is chapter is current as of October 2006, and has been translated 
from Italian into English by Federico Lenzerini.
¹ Congress is empowered . . . [t]o recognize the ethnic and cultural pre-existence of indigenous peoples 
of Argentina. To guarantee respect for the identity and the right to bilingual and intercultural educa-
tion; to recognize the legal capacity of their communities, and the community possession and ownership 
of the lands they traditionally occupy; and to regulate the granting of other lands adequate and suﬃ  cient 
for human development; none of them shall be sold, transmitted or subject to liens or attachments. To 
guarantee their participation in issues related to their natural resources and in other interests aﬀ ect-
ing them. Th e provinces may jointly exercise these powers.” (Oﬃ  cial translation, available at <http://
www.argentina.gov.ar/argentina/portal/documentos/constitucion_ingles.pdf>, last visited on 
28 August 2007.
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nation oﬀ ering great opportunities to European immigrants and foreign investors, 
without consideration for the indigenous part of the population. Th e members 
of those minorities who survived the slaughters (perpetrated ﬁ rst by Spanish col-
onizers and then by Argentines themselves²), lived for about a century with the 
misleading status of Argentine citizens and under the illusion of ‘oﬃ  cial’ equality 
with whites and half-caste people.³ Th is equality led to a suppression of the ethnic, 
cultural and legal diversities of the colonial period, translating into the eﬀ ective 
reduction of the indigenous minorities, which, by means of ignoring their diﬀ er-
ences, were intended to be integrated into the dominant European society.
Only when Perón took power in 1946–1955 did a policy of ‘integración 
socio-cultural’ begin, which was followed, at the beginning of the 1970s, by the 
policy of ‘reparación histórica’ for wrongs suﬀ ered by indigenous peoples, 
including in particular deprivation of lands and marginalization from national 
socio-economic progress.⁴ Th e military coup d’etat of 1976 blocked all activities 
developed by the institutions and representative organizations of the indigenous 
peoples.⁵ Th e end of military government in 1983 gave rise to the beginning of a 
new ‘indigenist policy’, aimed at considering the indigenous person as a ‘diverse 
subject’, whose diversity was to be safeguarded and respected. It was a signiﬁ cant 
step forward towards the recognition of cultural and legal pluralism for a coun-
try that had previously preferred to present itself as ‘white’ and ‘European’ and 
to identify itself with foreign contributions rather than with its indigenous cul-
ture. In previous years, the indigenous communities themselves had developed a 
progressively growing consciousness of their own rights, thanks to the activism 
² Based on the project to construct a ‘white and homogeneous nation’, the Argentine 
Constitution of 1853/60 entrusted the Congreso de la Nación with the task of ‘[p]roveer a la seguri-
dad de las fronteras; conservar el trato pacíﬁ co con los indios, y promover la conversión de ellos 
al catolicismo’ (Art 67, No 15). Th is provision legitimized two terrible military campaigns: the 
Conquista del deserto, in 1880, carried out in the regions of Patagonia and Pampa, which moved 
the Southern border of the country to the Río Negro, and the Campaña del Chaco, in 1884, which 
moved the Northern Argentine border to the Río Bermejo. Th e oﬃ  cial records of the army indi-
cate that 10,656 indigenous people were killed during the 1880 campaign and 1,679 during the 
1884 campaign. Th ese ﬁ gures do not include deaths caused by hunger, hardship, privations and 
diseases.
³ Since 1810, when Argentina obtained independence from Spain, successive governments have 
proclaimed the principles of equality and freedom of indigenous peoples a number of times, par-
ticularly through abrogating those colonial institutions such as mita and encomienda, which bound 
indigenous inhabitants to the service of white people.
⁴ See M. Carrasco, Los derechos de los pueblos indígenas en Argentina (Buenos Aires: Grupo 
Internacional de Trabajo sobre Asuntos Indígenas, Asociación de Comunidades Aborígenes Lhaka 
Honhat, 2000). Th e main measure taken by Perón in favour of indigenous peoples was the dis-
tribution of identity documents to indigenous inhabitants, who became Argentine citizens and 
strengthened the electoral force of the Partido Justicialista.
⁵ In 1971, for example, the Confederación Indigena Neuquina was established, followed by the 
Asociación Indigena de la República Argentina in 1975. Th e latter association sent its representa-
tives to the Consejo Mundial de Pueblos Indigenas, held in Canada in that same year.
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of their ﬁ rst representative organizations and to the growing attention of the inter-
national community with regard to the issue of the protection of minorities.⁶
Th is new indigenist policy was inaugurated by the province of Formosa, which 
ﬁ rst approved, in 1984, the Ley Integral del Aborigen,⁷ followed by the provinces 
of Jujuy, Río Negro, Buenos Aires, El Chaco, Pampa, Neuquén, Chubut, and 
Salta. All these provinces, between 1986 and 1988, amended their constitutions 
through the introduction of provisions speciﬁ cally dealing with local indigenous 
populations.⁸ However, these provisions varied in content with respect to one 
another: for instance, the Constitution of Chubut even recognizes indigenous 
intellectual property, while the Constitution of Salta recognizes the legal person-
ality and land ownership of indigenous peoples only to the extent that they are 
granted by subsequent laws. Provincial constitutional reforms were then followed 
by ad hoc provincial laws, some of which contemplated the institution of speciﬁ c 
bodies for the protection and representation of local indigenous communities,⁹ 
⁶ Argentina has the lowest proportion of indigenous peoples living in its territory, in compari-
son with other Latin-American countries. According to the oﬃ  cial data collected by the Encuesta 
Complementaria de Pueblos Indigenas between 2004 and 2005, 402,921 indigenous persons 
live in the country, corresponding to 1 per cent of the total population, which is estimated as 
being 37,282,970 people by the Censo Nacional de Población Hogares y Viviendas of 2001. It 
is estimated that in 2006 the total Argentine population was about 39 million people, of whom 
2.8 per cent recognize themselves as belonging to an autochthonous community, including: the 
Mbya-Guaraní, Mocoví, Pilagá, Toba, Vilela and Wichí communities living in the regions of the 
North-East (provinces of Chaco, Formosa, Misiones, and Santa Fe); the Atacama, Avá-Guaraní, 
Chané, Chorote, Chulupí, Diaguita, Calchaquí, Kolla, Omaguaca, Ocloya, Tapiete, Toba, Tupí-
Guaraní, and Wichí communities living in the North-West regions (provinces of Jujuy, Salta, 
Santiago del Estero, Tucumán, La Rioja, San Juan, and Catamarca); the Mapuche, Ona, Tehuelche, 
and Yamana communities living in the Southern regions (provinces of Chubut, Neuquén, Santa 
Cruz, and Tierra del Fuego); the Huarpe and Rankulche communities living in the regions of 
the central part of the country (provinces of Mendoza, La Pampa, and Buenos Aires). Th e largest 
community is the Mapuche (26 per cent of the whole indigenous population of Argentina), while 
the smallest ones are the Chulupí (0.1 per cent), the Tapiete (0.12 per cent) and the Ona (0.12 per 
cent). In 1895 it was believed that the total indigenous population of Argentina was 180,000 peo-
ple, representing 4.3 per cent of the whole population (estimated as then being 4,014,911 people). 
In 1965 the ﬁ rst Censo Indígeno Nacional was started, which was never completed. Th e partial 
data collected indicated 165,381 indigenous persons (75,675 of whom were eﬀ ectively registered 
and 89,706 only reckoned). In 1970 in the Formosa province 8,611 indigenous inhabitants were 
counted, while 17,235 were registered in the Salta province in 1984.
⁷ Ley Integral del Aborigen of the Formosa province (No 426 of 1984). See A Idoyaga Molina, 
‘Análisis antropológico de la ley integral del aborigen de la provincia de Formosa (Argentina)’, in 
A. Levaggi (ed), El aborigen y el derecho en el pasado y el presente (Buenos Aires, 1990), pp 285–337.
⁸ Th ese amendments included: Art 50 of the Constitution of the Jujuy province, adopted in 
1986; Art 42 of the Constitution of the Río Negro province (1988); Art 79 of the Constitution 
of the Formosa province (1991). In 1994 the constitutions of the provinces of Buenos Aires (Art 
36 No. 9), Chaco (Art 37), Pampa (Art 6 para. 2), Neuquén (Art 23 lett. d) and Chubut (Art 34) 
were also amended. More recent (1998) is the amendment of the Constitution of the Salta province 
(Art 15). See Carrasco, op cit, pp 46–48 and 53–56. 
⁹ See, eg, the Instituto de Comunidades Aborígenes of the Formosa province, established with 
the law quoted in n 6 above; Instituto Provincial de Aborigen, established with Ley de promoción y 
desarrollo del aborigen No 6373 of 1986 (Salta province). See M Carrasco, ‘‘Indigenismo y democ-
racia: clientes, políticos, punteros, caciques, gente’’, (1994) 15 Cuadernos (Instituto Nacional de 
Antropología y Pensamiento Latinoamericano, Buenos Aires), , pp 9–22.
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while others already provided them with the attribution of lands.¹⁰ Some of them, 
ﬁ nally, simply reproduced applicable national legislation.¹¹ In this respect, at the 
federal level the Ley de Política Indígena y Apoyo a las Comunidades Aborígenes 
(n. 23.302) was enacted in 1985, followed in 1990 by the institution of the Foro 
Permanente por los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas, to which both indigenous 
representatives and organizations and associations ﬁ ghting for the recognition of 
indigenous rights adhered. Finally, in 1992 the Ley Ratiﬁ catoria del Convenio 169 
sobre pueblos indígenas y tribales en países independientes was enacted.¹²
Th e twentieth century ended with the enactment (in 1994) of the new consti-
tutional provision reproduced above, which replaced the obsolete and inappro-
priate rule of 1853/60.¹³ In drafting this new provision the Constituent Assembly 
considered a lot of proposals coming from indigenous associations. It was pres-
sured by the Equipo Nacional de Pastoral Aborigen and the Asociación Indígena de 
la República Argentina, which created speciﬁ c lobbies aimed at securing the con-
stant presence of indigenous representatives before the Constituent Assembly.¹⁴
¹⁰ See, eg, Law 405 of 1998 (Tierra del Fuego province), named Adjudicación de tierras a las 
comunidades indígenas del pueblo Ona de la Provincia.
¹¹ See, eg, Ley de Adesión de la provincia al régimen de la ley nacional 23.302 (No 5754) 
(Mendoza); Ley de Subprograma Integral de Mejoramento en la calidad de la vida de las comunidades 
aborígenes (No 4384 of 1998), Ley de Creación del Instituto de comunidades indígenas (No 2657 of 
1991) and Ley de Creación del registro de Comunidades indígenas de la provicia del Chubut (No 4013) 
(Chubut); Ley Convenio Ministerio del Interior—Campaña hacia una sociedad con todos (No 1610 
of 1994) (La Pampa); Ley Dirección provincial de Asuntos Guaraníes—Creación—Comunidades 
guaraníes—Deroga Ley 2435 (No 2727 of 1989) (Misiones); Ley de Instituto nacional de Asuntos 
indígenas. Adhesión ley 23303 (No 2553 of 1992) (Río Negro); Ley de comunidades aborígenes 
(No 11078 of 1994) (Santa Fe); Ley de Reservas indígenas (No 4086 of 1966), and Ley de promoción y 
desarrollo del aborigen (No 6373 of 1986) (Salta).
¹² Ley 24.071. Th e 1989 ILO Convention No 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries entered into force on 3 July 2001 and replaced, for state parties, the 1957 
ILO Convention No 107 concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other 
Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, already ratiﬁ ed by Argentina in 
1959. Both conventions are available at <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm> (last 
visited on 13 December 2006)
¹³ See n 2 above.
¹⁴ Among the proposals submitted to the Constituent Assembly the following are worth 
mentioning: Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos, Comisión de Asuntos Indígenas. 
Conclusiones del Encuentro por la reforma constitucional, Buenos Aires, 21–23 April 1994; Congreso 
Indigena de Integración Patagónica, Conclusiones sobre la reforma constitucional, El Bolsón, Río 
Negro, 16–19 April 1994; Asociación Indigena de la República Argentina, Los indígenas en la 
reforma constitucional, Buenos Aires 1994; Equipo Nacional de Pastoral Aborigen, Garantizar los 
derechos indígenas en la reforma constitucional, Buenos Aires, October 1993; Pueblos Indígenas-
Tribales de los Bosques Tropicales, Resolución de la Conferencia de Penang, Malaysia, February 1992; 
Conferencia Iberoamericana de Comisiones Nacionales para la Conmemoración del Descubrimiento de 
América. Encuentro de dos mundos, VII Reunión, Guatemala, 1989; Consejo Mundial de Pueblos 
Indios, Declaración de principios, IV Asamblea Mundial, Panamá, 1984. Th e Comisión de Nuevos 
Derechos y Garantías, after having examined about sixty proposals presented by the various indi-
genous groups, presented a Bill to the Constituent Convention on 7 July 1994, which was modiﬁ ed 
by the Comisión de Redacción of the Convention. Th e Bill was not substantially diﬀ erent from the 
text that was then adopted, stating as follows: ‘[r]econocer en concurrencia con las provincias, la 
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b) Indigenous rights recognized in 1994: aspects and problems
Th e indigenous rights recognised by the Constitution of Argentina have a col-
lective or group dimension.¹⁵ Th eir operation¹⁶ could consequently result in legal 
conﬂ icts, on account of both the restrictions they imply on the liberties and rights 
of individuals ‘external’ to the groups concerned and the threats they present to 
certain consolidated social equilibriums. Th is may be an explanation, though it is 
certainly not a justiﬁ cation, for Argentina’s diﬃ  culty and tardiness—at both the 
federal and provincial level—in implementing the rights of indigenous peoples 
which were aﬃ  rmed in 1994.
Th rough the aﬃ  rmation of the ‘preexistencia étnica y cultural de los pue-
blos indígenas argentinos’ the thesis that, irrespective of the constitutional rec-
ognition, indigenous populations already existed on the state territory before 
1994—possessing their own culture, rights and administrative system—has 
been accepted. Furthermore, some scholars have argued that, through the adop-
tion of the constitutional provision at issue, the federal state recognised its histor-
ical responsibility for the genocide suﬀ ered by the Native Peoples, legitimating a 
diﬀ erent legal status (ie a positive discrimination)—as reparation for the aﬄ  ictions 
suﬀ ered—which grants ethnic, cultural and legal pluralism.¹⁷ To this end the 
Constitution explicitly recognizes ‘la posesión y propriedad comunitarias de las 
preexistencia de los pueblos indígenas constitutivos de la Nación Argentina, garantizando el res-
peto a su identidad étnica y cultural; la personería jurídica de sus comunidades; la posesión y pro-
priedad comunitaria de las tierras que tradicionalmente ocupan, disponiendo la entrega de las aptas 
y suﬁ cientes para el desarrollo humano, las que no seran enajenables ni embargables; asegurar su 
acceso a una educación bilingüe e intercultural; y a su participación en las decisiones para la utiliza-
ción racional, administración y conservación de los recursos naturales en la gestión de sus intereses 
y en la vida nacional’ (‘[r]ecognize in concurrence with provinces, the pre-existence of indigenous peoples 
who constituted the Argentine Nation, guaranteeing respect for their ethnic and cultural identity; legal 
personality of their communities; possession and communal property of lands they have traditionally 
inhabited, arranging the delivery of the lands suitable and suﬃ  cient for human development, which 
will be neither alienable nor seizable; ensure their access to bilingual and intercultural education; and 
their participation in the decisions for the rational use, administration and conservation of natural 
resources in the management of their interests and in national life’. See G Segovia and JF Segovia, 
‘La protección de los indígenas’, in D. Pérez Guilhou (ed), Derecho constitucional de la reforma de 
1994 (Buenos Aires, 1995), p 331.
¹⁵  ‘Collective rights’ are meant as rights owned by a collectivity, which usually exercise them 
through its representative organs. Th ey can be rights of liberty (granting patrimonial, legislative 
and territorial autonomy), social rights (ie rights to public assistance) and political rights (rights 
of participation and representativeness). ‘Group rights’ are based on the fact of belonging to a 
collectivity; they may be of individual or collective character. See AE Galeotti, ‘I diritti collettivi’, 
in E Vitale (ed) Diritti umani e diritti delle minoranze. Problemi etici politici e giuridici (Turin, 
2000), pp 30–46. 
¹⁶ Th e word ‘operation’, as used in the text, means the aﬃ  rmation of a right and its codiﬁ cation 
in a formal written document, followed by the establishment of legal remedies for the enforcement 
of the right when it is infringed.
¹⁷ See L Ramos, ‘Reforma constitucional: una nueva relación entre el Estado argentino y los 
pueblos originarios’, available at <http://www.alertanet.org>, p 3.
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tierras que tradicionalmente ocupan’, that is to say the communal right of own-
ership of land already occupied by indigenous peoples before it was seized and 
assigned to white people in the form of individually owned estates after the mili-
tary campaigns of the late 1800s. ‘[L]a entrega de otras [tierras] aptas y suﬁ cientes 
para el desarrollo humano’, at the request of the communities concerned, is also 
contemplated.
Th ere are certain aspects of the constitutional provision that, if fully imple-
mented, could produce a number of problems not only of a legal but also of a 
social nature. First, through the recognition of the communal property of lands 
‘traditionally occupied’ by the communities concerned, the titles of property 
acquired in more recent times by other people as a matter of applicable law would 
be invalidated. Also, with respect to the assignment of new lands to such commu-
nities it is imperative to choose lands which prove appropriate for meeting their 
needs, bearing in mind the diﬃ  culties involved in the inevitable assignment of 
lands other than those expressly requested. Th ese diﬃ  culties arise by dint of the 
special relationship that the communities concerned have with that speciﬁ c land, 
the diﬀ erent relative signiﬁ cance of that particular territory and also, by virtue of 
the fact that the culturally speciﬁ c meaning of the land may not properly be taken 
into account.
It is also important to consider that, once a given land has been selected, third 
parties could—even in this event—claim rights on it, based on property titles 
previously obtained from institutions or former owners. In addition, some mem-
bers of the communities concerned could claim their right to obtain a plot of 
land, at the borders of the territories assigned to the community, on an individual 
basis.
Consequently, in order to give full implementation to the constitutional dik-
tat, the Argentine government should work on various levels. First, at the national 
level, the Instituto Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas, established by statute 23,302 
of 1985, should promote the maximum possible participation of indigenous 
 peoples in the implementation of the indigenist policy. It should be noted that 
this is often prevented in practice by the lack of funds and bureaucratic slug-
gishness, which reduce the concrete chances of organizing speciﬁ c activities to 
this end, particularly consultations and meetings. Also, given that relevant fed-
eral competences often overlap with those assigned to provincial governments, 
adequate discretion should be left to the latter, since such local administrative 
bodies are better placed and enjoy a more intimate knowledge of the reality of 
local indigenous communities than the central government.
Finally, the legal system should also provide its contribution, both at the level of 
local tribunals—through defending indigenous rights in the local disputes—and 
in the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, which should settle the problems 
deriving from national (concerning the implementation of Art 75, sentence 17 of 
the Constitution and related legislation) and international law (with regard to the 
possible conﬂ ict between domestic law and applicable international treaties).
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c) Th e recognition of community ownership of land 
in the provinces of Patagonia
Th e land known as Patagonia is composed of the provinces of Río Negro, 
Neuquén e Chubut and comprises about 55 million hectares. It was originally 
inhabited by indigenous populations which, during the Conquista del desierto, 
were exterminated or—through violence, deception and abuses—¹⁸ dispossessed 
of their traditional lands. Such lands became property of the state or province 
and were later assigned, sold or rented to non-indigenous people. Th ese past 
events represented the basis of the land claims of indigenous communities, lead-
ing to the development of a case-law which, through the application of the notion 
of ‘preexistencia étnica’, has actually aﬃ  rmed the land rights claimed by some 
Mapuche communities and denied the validity of titles granted by institutions to 
non-indigenous persons.
Already in 2000, in the judgment Narez, Leyla Marcela s/denuncia usurpación, 
a judge of the Chubut province recognised the right of ownership of the claimant 
over contended land as arising from the constant occupation since time imme-
morial, rather than from ‘una ocupación animus dominii’ and irrespective of rules 
of private law. Th e judge, expressly relying on the constitutional provision and on 
the position aﬃ  rmed by scholars, stated that ‘por explicita decisión del constituy-
ente las comunidades de referencia pasan a ser propietarias y poseedoras de las 
tierras que ocupan tradicionalmente’, deciding that the counterclaim had to be 
dismissed ‘por no constituir delíto el hecho investigado’.
More recently, in the case Oñate, Dolorindo y otros c/Rago, Pablo y otros 
s/Interdicto de retener, which was decided with a judgment released on 4 September 
2002, the principle was aﬃ  rmed that nobody with a property title or a contract 
of purchase may claim such a title over a piece of land through setting up or mov-
ing fences, particularly when an indigenous community traditionally occupies 
such land and claims its ownership.¹⁹ Th e subject of the dispute was a plot of land 
whose occupation and exploitation had often been a source of conﬂ ict between 
the Oñate family, (belonging to the indigenous community Kom Kiñé Mu 
which had traditionally occupied part of such land, and at least since 1925), and 
Pablo José Rago and José Luis Calviño, who also claimed the right of ownership 
over the land in question on the basis of a lease granted by the state to a former 
owner at the end of the 1950s. Th e defendants had tried to fence in the part of the 
land over which they claimed ownership, thus invading the portion occupied by 
the community. Th e members of the community reacted by removing the fences 
which had been put up—during the night—by the defendants and preventing 
¹⁸ See D Rodríguez Duch, ‘Los conﬂ ictos territoriales de los pueblos indígenas en la Patagonia’, 
in 167 Memoria, January 2003, available at <http://www.memoria.com.nx>.
¹⁹ Expte. 14.886–14-00, Juzgado Civil y comercial n 5 de la III Circunscripción Judicial de Río 
Negro.
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their reconstruction. In examining the case, Justice Riat recognised that ‘las 
pruebas producidas acreditan inequivocamente que los actores ocupan efectiva-
mente la veranada en disputa, sea como poseedores, sea como tenedores’ (‘the 
evidence supplied demonstrates unequivocally that the claimants eﬀ ectively occupy 
the veranada [summer pastures] under dispute, as holders’), adding that ‘el recono-
cimiento legal de una comunidad en esa zona permite inferir la mayor antigüedad 
de su ocupación’ (‘the legal recognition of a community in this zone allows the infer-
ence that its occupation occurred at a previous time’), given that ‘se entenderá como 
comunidades indígenas a los conjuntos de familias que se reconozcan como tales 
por el hecho de descender de poblaciones que habitaban el territorio nacional en la 
época de la conquista o colonización’ (‘the groups of families that are recognized as 
such by the fact of descending from populations who inhabited the national territory in 
the time of the conquest or colonization will be considered as indigenous communities’) 
(quoting in part the deﬁ nition of Art 2 of Ley 23,302). Recognizing the occupa-
tion of the land by the indigenous community concerned, the judge thus ordered 
the defendants to refrain from committing ‘todo acto que perturbe la ocupación 
de los actores en la zona de la veranada que dio motivo a estas actuaciones debi-
endo ocurrir por la vía y forma correspondiente para hacer valer los derechos que 
crean tener’ (‘all acts disturbing the occupation by the claimants of the zone of the 
veranada which triggered their legal claims, that must respect the correct means and 
forms to exercise the rights they deem to be entitled ’). In this way the judgment recog-
nised not only the possibility of hindering the movement of fences in indigenous 
lands (often carried out during the night), but also that the community itself is 
authorised immediately to remove such fences, on the condition that it eﬀ ectively 
exercises ‘la posesión o la tenencia efectiva’ of the land concerned and that there is 
a temporal proximity between the setting up of the fences and their removal. Th is 
conclusion was based on Art 2470 of the Código Civil, which states that:
[e]l hecho de la posesión da el derecho de protegerse en la posesión propia, y repulsar la 
fuerza con el empleo de una fuerza suﬁ ciente, en los casos en que los auxilios de la justicia 
llegarían demasiado tarde; y el que fuese desposeído podrá recobrarla de propia autoridad 
sin intervalo de tiempo, con tal que no exceda los límites de la propia defensa.
([t]he fact that the possession exists gives its holders the right that it is legally protected, as well 
as to resist the attempts to forcibly discard it through using the necessary force, in the cases in 
which help from the competent authorities would arrive too late; and those who were dispos-
sessed of it will be able to recover it through using their own authority immediately, provided 
that it does not exceed the limits of proper defence)
Th e judgment in the case of Quintriqueo, José c/ Newbery, Tomás s/Acción autónoma 
de nulidad de sentencia²⁰ of June 2003 is an extremely interesting example of 
jurisprudence, not only in view of the aﬃ  rmation of claimed indigenous rights, 
²⁰ Expte. 14.446 del Juzgado civil de la IV Circunscripcuión judicial de la provincia de Neuquén 
of 3 June 2003.
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but also because it grants their concrete enforcement. Th e decision declared void 
a previous judgment issued by a judge of Junín de los Andes, who had sentenced 
the removal of the Mapuche Quintriqueo community from the territory of Paso 
Coihue after recognising the heir of a US citizen as the legitimate owner of that 
land. Th is person had received the land concerned from the Argentine govern-
ment as a gift to express gratitude for funding the anti-indigenous campaign at 
the relevant time. Th e immediate restitution of the land to the community con-
cerned was also ordered as a precautionary measure, which was actually carried 
out. As emerges from the reading of the judgment, Justice Farias held that:
atento las razones y el derecho invocado, normas de rango constitucional traídas, y a ﬁ n 
de evitar perjuicios inminentes a los pobladores del paraje Paso Coihue . . . disponese con 
caracter de medida cautelar innovativa, la restitución de la situación fáctica del lugar a la 
existente con anterioridad al 15 de mayo de 2003, suspendiendose la orden de desalojo 
dispuesta en autos ‘Newbery c/Quintriqueo s/Desalojo’ hasta tanto exista resolución en 
las presentes actuaciones’.
(having considered the claimants’ reasons and the invoked right, that norms of constitu-
tional status have been infringed, and in order to avoid imminent damage to the settlers of 
the place called Paso Coihue . . . it is decided, as an innovative precautionary measure, to 
order a return to the previous situation of the place before 15 May 2003, the order of eviction 
decided in ‘Newbery c/Quintriqueo s/Desalojo’ being suspended, as far as a solution exists for 
the actions performed.)
He added ﬁ nally that the same judge who ‘diligenciara el desalojo . . . debería hacer 
entrega de la tenencia del predio a los pobladores de la Comunidad Quintriqueo, 
labrandose acta de todo lo actuado’ (‘will manage the eviction notice . . . should do 
so by making available the tenancy of the property to the settlers of the Community 
Quintriqueo, taking record of everything operated ’).
Finally, a more recent decision was enacted in August 2004 by Justice Riat 
in the case Sede Alfredo y otros c/Vila, Herminia y otros s/desalojo.²¹ Th is judg-
ment recognised the right ‘de posesión indígena’ with respect to property titles 
granted by the state, dismissing a claim for removal requested by the Sede fam-
ily with regard to some members of the Mapuche community Kom Kiñé Mu of 
Arroyo de las Minas, who have for a long time occupied an area of land called 
Marcos Fernández.²² Th e main argument on which the judgment is based relies 
on the prevalence of the national Constitution over the civil code, that is to 
say on the primacy of the concept of ‘preexistencia étnica’ over property titles. 
As a consequence, despite the fact that the Sede family owned a property title 
granted by the former governor of the Masaccessi province, removal of Mapuche 
²¹ Expte. 14012–238-99, Juzgado Civil y Comercial n. 5 de la III Circunscripción Judicial de 
Río Negro. 
²² Th e land at stake had been donated in 1900 to the cacique (local political leader)—in this 
case, Ancalao—by a decree of President Roca, as a reward for having cooperated in the Conquista 
del desierto. Occupation by the Reserva Ancalao was later recognised by provincial legislation.
Lenzer_Ch13.indd   353 9/20/2007   12:18:52 PM
International, Regional and Domestic Practice354
families resulted as being ‘improcedente porqué la posesión de los demandados 
(Mapuches) es necesariamente anterior a los títulos de los actores (ﬂ ia Sede) ya que 
incluso es anterior a la formación misma del Estado que los conﬁ rió’ (‘inappropri-
ate because the possession of the defendants (Mapuches) necessarily precedes the title of 
the claimants (ﬂ ia Sede) since the possession existed even before the formation of the 
State that granted such titles’. Th e judge also clariﬁ ed that:
la posesión comunitaria de los pueblos indígenas no es la posesión individual del Código 
civil. Por mandato operativo, categórico e inequívoco de la Constitución nacional, toda 
ocupación tradicional de una comunidad indígena debe juzgarse como posesión comu-
nitaria aunque los integrantes no hayan ejercido por sí los actos posesorios típicos de la 
ley inferior (Código civil, art. 2384). Es la propia Constitución la que nos dice que esas 
comunidades han poseído y poseen juridicamente por la sencilla razón de preexistir al 
Estado y conservar la ocupación tradicional.
(the communitarian possession of indigenous peoples does not correspond to the form of 
individual ownership provided for by the civil Code. Pursuant to an operational, cat-
egorical and unequivocal order of the national Constitution, any traditional occupa-
tion of an indigenous community must be considered as community possession although its 
members have not practised it by means of the typical acts qualifying ownership accord-
ing to subordinate law (civil Code, art. 2384). It is precisely the Constitution which tells 
us that these communities have possessed and possess legally [the land] for the simple 
reason of pre-existence to the State and of preserving their traditional occupation’)
Recalling the pertinent doctrine,²³ the judge ﬁ nally emphasized that:
la protección consagrada para la propriedad de las comunidades indígenas argentinas por 
el artículo 75 inc. 17 de la Constitución Nacional hace innecesaria e inconveniente su 
inclusión en el Código civil, ya que ello implicaría una desjerarquización no querida por 
el poder constituyente.
(the protection granted with respect to the ownership of Argentine indigenous communities by 
article 75 inc. 17 of the National Constitution makes its inclusion in the civil Code unneces-
sary and inopportune, since it would imply a de-hierarchicalization not desired by the con-
stituent power’)
Th e particular signiﬁ cance of this decision rests on the fact that recognition of the 
pre-existence of local indigenous peoples to the Argentine state implies that ‘el 
derecho objetivo ha cambiado’ and that—as pointed out by Rodríguez Duch—
the indigenous question is now to be resolved by relying on ‘la nuevas normas de 
derecho público dictadas especiﬁ camente, aun en contra de las viejas normas de 
derecho privado, tales como el Código civil’.²⁴
Finally, also in 2004, the judgment Comunidad Mapuche Huayquillan c/Brescia, 
Celso Armando y otro²⁵ recognised the ownership of a piece of land acquired 
²³ Th e judge referred, in particular, to Jorge Alterini, Pablo Corna, and Alejandra Vázquez.
²⁴ See D Rodríguez Duch, ‘El derecho de las comunidades originarias en las decisiones juris-
prudenciales’, in Derecho de los Pueblos Indigenas—Derecho de las comunidades, available at <http://
www.indigenas.bioetica.org>.
²⁵ Judgment of 18 August 2004 of the Juzgado en lo Civil, Comercial, Laboral y de Mineria de 
Chos Malal, provincia de Neuquén. 
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through adverse possession by a Mapuche community which demonstrated that 
it had occupied the claimed territory—continuously and peacefully—for over 
forty years, through the construction of houses and constant agricultural activ-
ity. Th e ﬁ nding was based on sentence 17 of Art 75 of the Constitution, on the 
ILO Convention No 169, and on the regulation of adverse possession by the civil 
code in force at the relevant time.
d) Th e request for protection of the environment 
by Argentine autochthonous communities
Some indigenous communities of Argentina have submitted actions of amparo,²⁶ 
claiming that their natural environment is threatened by certain projects of 
deforestation, exploitation of surface and sub-surface resources, as well as by the 
construction of great public works and infrastructures.
In September 2004 the judgment released by the Juzgado Civil de Primera 
Instancia de Junín de los Andes in the case Comunidad Mapuche Paichil Antreao 
y otro c/Prov. del Neuquén s/ Acción de Amparo²⁷ imposed the suspension of the 
indiscriminate felling of trees and extraction of volcanic materials from the slopes 
of Cerro Belvedere, in Villa La Angostura. Th e Mapuche community Paichil 
Antreao, although it did not have ‘personería jurídica inscripta’, had presented 
an amparo action with the assistance of the Centro de Derechos Humanos y 
Ambiente, maintaining that deforestation would lead to the extinction of rare 
and ancient plant species, with the addition of damage caused by the works of 
extraction. Th ey also emphasised that the sacredness of the land concerned—
where the community had performed its religious practices and ceremonies since 
time immemorial—would be violated. Th e judgment recognised the legitimacy 
of the claim presented by the community concerned ‘aún sin personería jurídica 
inscripta’. In consideration of the fact that ‘la erradicación de bosques disminuye 
la diversidad biológica y destruye los pulmones que ayudan a regenerar la tierra’, 
and pursuant to Art 41 of the national Constitution (recognizing the right to 
protection of one’s own environment) it decided that the felling of trees and 
extractive operations had to be stopped within ten days.
²⁶ Section 43, para 1 of the national Costitution states that ‘[t]oda persona puede interponer 
acción expedita y rápida de amparo, siempre que no exista otro medio judicial más idóneo, con-
tra todo acto u omisión de autoridades públicas o de particulares, que en forma actual o inmi-
nente lesione, restrinja, altere o amenace, con arbitrariedad o ilegalidad maniﬁ esta, derechos y 
garantías reconocidos por esta Constitución, un tratado o una ley. En el caso, el juez podrá declarar 
la incostitucionalidad de la norma en que se funde el acto u omisión lesiva’ (‘[a]ny person shall ﬁ le 
a prompt and summary proceeding regarding constitutional guarantees [amparo], provided there is 
no other legal remedy, against any act or omission of the public authorities or individuals which cur-
rently or imminently may damage, limit, modify or threaten rights and guarantees recognized by this 
Constitution, treaties or laws, with open arbitrariness or illegality. In such case, the judge may declare 
that the act or omission is based on an unconstitutional rule’ (oﬃ  cial translation)).
²⁷ Expte. 15.320/03 del Juzgado Civil y Comercial de la IV Circunscripción Judicial del 
Neuquén. 
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Also in the context of environmental protection, the judgment Comunidad 
Indígena del Pueblo Wichi Hoktek TOI c/ Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo 
Sustentable of 2002 is worth mentioning, which is of particular importance 
for the fact of its being released by the national Supreme Court of Justice. It 
recognised the right of the Wichi Hoktek T’OI community to submit an amparo 
action before the Court of Justice of the Salta province, in order to obtain the 
cancellation of two administrative acts released by the Secretaría Provincial de 
Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable, authorizing ‘la deforestación indis-
criminada’ of a given area bordering the land inhabited by the indigenous com-
munity concerned. Th e local tribunal had rejected the amparo action, holding 
that, in order to obtain the cancellation of the aforementioned administrative 
acts, the interested community had to rely on available administrative or judi-
cial procedures. Th e Supreme Court, on the contrary, held that the provincial 
tribunal should grant the amparo action—precisely on account of the likely 
and irreparable damage to the environment caused by deforestation (including 
the extinction of certain animal species as well as the possible alteration of the 
climate and the soil). It was in fact a matter of ‘una efectiva protección de dere-
chos’ of the community concerned that could not adequately be safeguarded 
through ordinary means of recourse.
2. Chile
a) Indigenous peoples of contemporary Chile
Th e situation of the indigenous peoples living in the territory of Chile is very 
diﬀ erent from that of Argentina. Neither their existence nor a set of rights in 
their favour have yet been recognised by the Constitution. In addition, Chile 
has not ratiﬁ ed ILO Convention No 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries.²⁸
With regard to the nineteenth century, the story of relations between Chile 
and the local autochthonous populations is similar to nearby Argentina’s in a 
number of respects. Between 1860 and 1883 Chile also extended its control over 
²⁸ According to the census of 2002, at that time the total population of Chile amounted to 
15,116,435 people, including 692,192 (4.6 per cent) of inhabitants who declared that they belonged 
to an indigenous group (87.3 per cent of them were of Mapuche origin and 12.68 per cent belonged 
to other ethnic groups, ie Alacalufe/Kawéskar, Atacameno/Lickanantay, Aymara, Colla, Quechua, 
Rapa Nui e and Yámana; these numbers do not include the Diaguita community, which has not 
been recognised as indigenous by law and is thus not considered in the census). Th e previous cen-
sus, held in 1992, indicated that 998,385 people over the age of 14 had declared that they belonged 
to an indigenous population; this number jumped to 1,350,000 if children under 14 years old were 
also considered, amounting to 10 per cent of the total population. See J Aylwin, ‘Implementación 
de legislación y jurusprudencia nacional relativa a los derechos de los pueblos indígenas: la experi-
encia de Chile’, Observatorio de Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas, Documento de Trabajo n. 3, 
available at <http://www.observatorioderechosindigenas.cl>.
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some austral territories (previously belonging to the Aonikénk and Selknam 
communities), making those lands available for European investors through a 
process deﬁ ned by Chilean historians as la Paciﬁ cación de la Araucanía. Th e lands 
belonging to the Mapuche were occupied through recourse to the army. Th e 
Mapuche were thus stripped of their ancestral lands and conﬁ ned to some 3,000 
reservations which were concentrated into 5 per cent of the area of the territory 
they originally occupied. Here too the rest of the territories were placed at the 
disposal of foreign investors and large landowners.
Th e twentieth century saw in a number of laws promoting the partition and 
subsequent sale of lands included in the Mapuche reservations, without grant-
ing the Mapuche any right of pre-emption. Land partition (and the subsequent 
division of the community) ‘era la única manera de incorporar [los indígenas] 
plenamente a la civilización’, as explained by a Decree-law (No 266) of 1931.
Th e presidency of Allende represented a short parenthesis in the indigenist 
policy of those years. Indeed in 1972 Ley Indígena n. 17.729 providing for the 
restitution of lands was enacted (which was actually carried out with regard 
to some 60,000 hectares), and this law established the Instituto de Desarrollo 
Indígena—with the task of ‘promover el desarrollo social, educacional y cultural 
de los indígenas de Chile, considerando su idiosincrasia y respetando sus costum-
bres’ (art 38)—granting support for social and cultural rights and ensuring the 
teaching of the Mapudungun²⁹ language together with Spanish.
During the regime of Pinochet (1973–1990)—whose motto ‘no existen pob-
laciones indígenas, somos todos chilenos’ is well-known—the process of the 
division and sale of indigenous lands restarted with two decree-laws enacted in 
1979,³⁰ which established that the indigenous reservations that still existed at 
that time had to be sold in the form of individual lots. Th ey also speciﬁ ed that 
‘las hijuelas resultantes de la división de las reservas dejarán de considerarse indí-
genas, e indígenas sus adjudicatarios’. In addition, the Código de Aguas of 1981 
authorised the government to grant rights over surface and subsurface waterways 
in favour of private individuals also in the lands inhabited by indigenous com-
munities, harming in particular the Aymara of the North in favour of certain 
mining enterprises.
After the end of the Pinochet regime, new institutions started a timid and 
undeﬁ ned policy for indigenous communities, which had just started to organ-
ize themselves in order to claim their own rights and promote their protec-
tion. In 1993 the Congress approved the Ley 19.253 sobre Protección, Fomento 
y Desarrollo de los Indígenas—better known as Ley Indígena—which at that 
time was certainly an important result, despite some contradictions in its text. 
Indeed the law in question established the Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo 
Indígena (CONADI), an institution which includes a minority of indigenous 
²⁹ See J Garrido et al, Historia de la reforma agraria en Chile (Santiago de Chile, 1990).
³⁰ Decree laws No 2568 and No 2750.
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representatives amongst its members. Th is should ensure that it actually works to 
safeguard indigenous rights adequately.
On the other hand, however, it recognised indigenous peoples simply as 
‘ethnic groups’ and not as ‘populations’. Moreover, it did not include a clear 
catalogue of the political and territorial rights accorded to them. Furthermore, 
the law restricted the right of association of indigenous communities to ‘comuni-
dades territoriales’ or ‘asociaciones funcionales’, which, however, are not allowed 
to group themselves into federations. With regard to indigenous lands, the law 
established that this term may be recognised only for those lands that ‘las per-
sonas o comunidades indígenas actualmente ocupan en propriedad o posesión’ 
on the basis of titles recognised to the communities by the state (Art 12), those 
which are oﬃ  cially registered in the Registro de Tierras Indígenas or those that 
are expressly declared as possessing these characteristics by domestic courts.
Th e fact that lands cannot be ‘enajenadas, embargadas, gravadas, ni adquiri-
das por prescripción’ is also stressed (Art 13). In addition—by virtue of a Fondo 
de Tierras y Aguas Indígenas—the possibility of obtaining an allowance for the 
purchase of lands is provided. Th is allowance may also be obtained in view of 
determining—in the event of a controversy—what rights actually exist over 
waters, as well as with the aim of facilitating the acquisition of public lands by 
the claimant communities. Th e law, however, neither incorporated the concept of 
‘territorialidad indígena’ established by ILO Convention No 169 nor recognised 
indigenous rights over natural resources, which have recently acquired consider-
able importance in the context of indigenous claims. It may be interesting to note 
that the law contemplated the possibility of ‘permutar por tierras de no indíge-
nas, de similar valor comercial debidamente acreditado, las que se consideraran 
tierras indígenas, desafectándose las primeras’ (‘to exchange indigenous lands for 
non-indigenous ones, of similar commercial value properly credited, which will be 
considered to be indigenous lands’), with the authorization of CONADI.
In addition to the Ley Indígena, two more proposals were advanced in 1993; 
namely the ratiﬁ cation of ILO Convention No. 169 and the inclusion of an 
amendment in the national Constitution which explicitly recognised indigen-
ous rights. Both proposals were rejected at that time and again in 2005, when 
President Lagos presented them to the National Congress. However, President 
Lagos laudably tried to inaugurate a ‘new phase’ in the relationship between 
the government and the autochthonous communities. In 2001 he established 
the Comisión de Verdad Histórica y Nuevo Trato, which, through the Informe 
released in 2003, recognised the mistakes and contradictions that had charac-
terised the past indigenist policy, renewing the invitation to ratify Convention 
No 169 and to reform the Constitution. Th e Informe also established certain eco-
nomic measures aimed at supporting the indigenous peoples.
Th e proposal of constitutional reform put forward in 2005 may represent a sig-
niﬁ cant ﬁ rst step forward in the national policy concerning indigenous people. 
However it did not contemplate any speciﬁ c reference to collective political, cultural 
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and territorial rights, as suggested by the Comisión³¹, which had proposed the 
inclusion of the following provision:
la ley garantizará el derecho a conservar, desarrollar y fortalecer la identidad, idiomas, 
instituciones y tradiciones espirituales, sociales y culturales de los pueblos indígenas que 
habitan el territorio nacional.
the law will ensure the right to preserve, develop and strengthen the identity, lan-
guages, institutions, and spiritual, social and cultural traditions of the indigenous 
peoples who inhabit the national territory
b) Th e problem of safeguarding indigenous rights over lands 
and natural resources in contemporary Chile³²
Today, protection of the ownership of ancestral lands occupied by indigenous 
peoples in Chile is limited. Th is is due to the lack of express recognition of such 
rights in the Constitution or other normative texts. In addition, economic and 
political interests lead governmental institutions to pursue an indigenist policy 
that is undeﬁ ned and often contradictory. Since the 1990s the Chilean econ-
omy has opened up to national and foreign investments, both public and private, 
which often have lands inhabited or claimed by indigenous communities as their 
target. Th e resulting clash among opposing irreconcilable interests is self-evident, 
since the rights claimed by indigenous peoples are, in addition to the owner-
ship of ancestral lands,³³ the rights of exploitation and management of natural 
³¹ Th e Comisión de Verdad Histórica y Nuevo Trato in the Informe of 2003 recommended modi-
fying the Constitution so as to aﬃ  rm ‘la existencia de lo Pueblos Indígenas, que forman parte de la 
nación chilena, y reconozca que poseen culturas e identidades proprias’; ‘que los Pueblos Indígenas 
de Chile son descendientes de las sociedades precoloniales que se desarrollaron en el territorio sobre 
el que actualmente el Estado chileno extiende su soberanía, a las que estan ligadas por una con-
tinuidad histórica’; and ‘establezca el deber del Estado de garantizar la preservación de la diver-
sidad étnico cultural de la nación y, por consiguiente, la preservación y el ejercicio de la cultura y
la identidad de los Pueblos Indigenas con pleno respeto de la autonomía de sus miembros; y que 
en consonancia con dicha declaración, reconozca y garantice el ejercicio de un conjunto de dere-
chos colectivos a favor de los pueblos indigenas’ (‘the existence of the Indigenous Peoples, which 
are a part of the Chilean nation, and admit that they possess their own cultures and identities’; ‘that 
the Indigenous Peoples of Chile are descendants of the pre-colonial societies who developed in the ter-
ritory on which at present the Chilean State extends his sovereignty, to which they are tied by his-
torical continuity’; and ‘to establish the duty of the State to guarantee the preservation of the 
ethnical-cultural diversity of the nation and, consequently, the preservation and the exercise of 
the culture and the identity of Indigenous Peoples with full respect of the autonomy of their members; and 
that, consistently with the foregoing, to recognize and guarantee the exercise of a set of collective rights in 
favour of indigenous peoples’) (Cuerpo III, p. 127; see Aylwin, op cit, n 39).
³² According to data collected in 2005, new lands were assigned to indigenous communities 
through the CONADI and the Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, and their ownership over the 
lands they already occupied was recognised. Th e assigned lands amounted to a total of 384,150 
hectares, including 75,000 hectares of new lands.
³³ For example, the construction of the hydro-electric power plant at Ralco in upper Bío Bío, 
completed in 2004, led to the ﬂ ooding of a land ancestrally inhabited by the Mapuche Peuhenche, 
who opposed the project in vain and who were eventually displaced to another territory. In 2003, 
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resources and surface and subsurface watercourses, which are essential for the 
survival of the communities concerned.³⁴ In more recent years, pursuant to the 
afore-mentioned Código de Aguas, the government has granted private persons 
and operators a right of free and perpetual supply of waters, keeping them out 
of the indigenous communities’ control. Nevertheless, on 4 October 2004, for 
the ﬁ rst time, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of an indigenous community 
in this respect. In the case concerning la Atacameña de Toconce, of the II Región 
de Antofagasta, the Court recognised ‘la propriedad ancestral indígena sobre las 
aguas, derivadas de prácticas consuetudinarias, [que] constituye dominio pleno 
por aplicación del los artículos 3 transitorio, inciso 2° y 64 de la Ley Indígena’ 
(‘the ancestral indigenous ownership of the waters derived from customary practices, 
falling within the scope of application of transitory article 3, No 2 and article 64 of 
the Indigenous Law’,)³⁵ rejecting the claims of the Empresa Sanitaria y de Servicios 
de Antofagasta ESSAN S.A.
Th e contradictory policy of the government and the lack of recognition of 
indigenous rights has triggered a number of protest rallies, demonstrative actions 
and cases of land occupation by indigenous dissidents, leading the institutions to 
react very harshly. At the legislative level, the Congress has blocked the process 
of ratiﬁ cation of ILO Convention No 169 and any other ongoing process of pro-
indigenous constitutional reform. Furthermore, police forces have used excessive 
violence to repress protest marches by indigenous people, thus being accused of 
violating the fundamental human rights of demonstrators.³⁶ Finally, the antiter-
rorism legislation in force (Ley antiterrorista n° 18.314)³⁷ has been applied with 
regard to some of the arrested indigenous activists, limiting their right to due 
ﬁ ve Peuhenche women reported on the situation to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, claiming violation of their rights, including the right to life and the right to private prop-
erty. Th anks to the mediation by the Commission an agreement was ﬁ nalised, which contemplated 
the reparation of pecuniary damages, restitution of claimed lands, improvement of participation 
by the Peuenche in the management of natural resources for their own development, as well as the 
promise to reopen negotiations for constitutional reform and the ratiﬁ cation of ILO Convention 
No 169.
³⁴ For example, in order to favour the exploitation of ore deposits located in the Northern part 
of the country, in areas inhabited by indigenous communities (Aymara, Quechua, Lickanatay, 
Coya, and Diaguita), the government ceded these areas and recognised the right to use and exploit 
watercourses, including underground ones, to non-indigenous people. In addition, intense plant 
cultivation aimed at producing precious wood modiﬁ ed the local landscape, environment, ﬂ ora 
and fauna of some lands belonging to the Mapuche, leading to the exhaustion of freshwater reserves 
on and under the ground.
³⁵ Judgment quoted by J Aylwin, Implementación de legislación y jurusprudencia nacional rela-
tiva a los derechos de los pueblos indígenas: la experiencia de Chile, Observatorio de Derechos de los 
Pueblos Indígenas, Documento de Trabajo n. 3, available at <www.observatorioderechosindige-
nas.cl>.
³⁶ Human Rights Watch and Observatorio de Derechos de los Pueblos Indigenas (2004) 
denounced cases of mistreatment perpetrated by the police while performing body searches and 
anti-uprising operations. Cases of torture were also reported, and a young person was killed in 
2002 by a bullet shot by an agent of the Carabineros.
³⁷ Only in the Araucaria region 300 Mapuche were charged with taking part in protest marches 
aimed at defending their land; 10 per cent of them were indicted for acts of terrorism.
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process and leading to disproportionate convictions which were upheld by the 
Supreme Court. Against this trend, however, the judgment released in July 2005 
by the Tribunal Oral en lo Penal de Temuco is worth mentioning, which rejected 
the charge of ‘asociación ilícita terrorista’ for a group of Mapuche. In doing this, 
the Tribunal speciﬁ ed that:
cualquier deﬁ nición de terrorismo que se quiera enunciar debe necesariamente contener 
el concepto de desprecio a la vida humana, propria o ajena, concepto que no resulta del 
contenido de los hechos que se relataron en la audiencia.³⁸
whatever deﬁ nition of terrorism one wants to use, it must necessarily include the concept of 
scorn to human life, of his/her or another person’s own, a concept that does not result from the 
content of the facts that were reported in the hearings
Similarly, the application of the Ley antiterrorista to the aforementioned cases was 
criticised on 7 April 2006 by the Tribunal de lo Penal de Angol, which acquitted 
the defendants from the charge of ‘incendio terrorista’, with respect to the areas 
of Poluco and Pidenco, on the basis of the fact that
la presunción simplemente legal establecida en el artículo 1° de la Ley n. 18.314, relativa 
a la ﬁ nalidad de producir en la población o en una parte de ella temor justiﬁ cado de ser 
victimas de delitos de la misma especie, se encuentra en abierta contraddicción con el dere-
cho a la presunción de innocencia que en nuestro país tiene rango constitucional por estar 
incorporado en los tratados internacionales ratiﬁ cados por el Chile, que nuestra Carta 
fundamental asegura respetar y garantizar en el inciso segundo de su artículo 5°.³⁹
the legal presumption established by Art 1 of the Law n. 18.314, relating to the purpose of trig-
gering in the population, or in a part of it, a well-founded fear of being a victim of the same 
sorts of crimes, is in clear contradiction to the right to be presumed innocent that in our coun-
try has constitutional status for being incorporated in the international agreements ratiﬁ ed 
by Chile, that our fundamental Law prescribes to be respected and guaranteed in the second 
paragraph of its article 5
In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal expressly referred to Art 8.2 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights and to Art 14.2 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Whereas the Tribunal does not possess 
the competence to declare the Ley antiterrorismo to be unconstitutional, it con-
siders this law as part of a legal system—the Chilean one—in which such treaty 
provisions are (rectius: should be) in force, explaining that:
[s]e debe tener presente respecto de la presunción legal del artículo 1° de la ley 18.314, en la 
cual el legislador asume que la conducta de las personas es constitutiva de delito terrorista 
prescindiendo de una investigación, de un juicio, vulnerando tratados internacionales ya 
antes mencionados y la propia ley procesal, es por ello que en la especie nos encontramos 
ante un caso en que el legislador, sin procedimiento alguno asume la intención volitiva de 
³⁸ Sentencia del Tribunal Oral en lo Penal de Temuco, RUC 02 00 14 24 99. RIT 080/2004 
of 27 July 2005. See FIDH, Informe. Chile. Posibilidades de cambio en la política hacia los pueblos 
indígenas, August 2006.
³⁹ Emphasis added.
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los acusados de querer infundir temor en la población o arrancar decisiones de la autori-
dad . . . la presunción simplemente legal no es propriamente un medio de prueba, sino que 
consituye un caso de inversión del onus probandi que favorece a quien la invoca y pone a 
cargo de la otra parte la prueba en contrario.⁴⁰
[t]he legal presumption set up by article 1 of the law 18.314 is to be taken into account, in 
which the legislator establishes that the conduct of the person is constitutive of a terrorist crime 
leaving aside any investigation or judgment, breaching the aforementioned international 
agreements and procedural law, and for which we are dealing with a case in which the legisla-
tor, without any procedure, presupposes the will of the accused person to instil fear in the popu-
lation or to force the authority to take certain decisions . . . the simply legal presumption is not 
properly a means of proof, but constitutes a case of reversal of the onus probandi which favours 
the party who invokes it and forces the other party to provide evidence to the contrary.
3. Conclusion
While by no means exhaustive, this chapter has aimed to describe the current 
status of indigenous rights in Argentina and Chile, with particular attention to 
reparatory measures that, where taken, have been granted or promised by the two 
countries.
With regard to Argentina, we may say that since the aﬃ  rmation of indigen-
ous rights in the constitutional reform of 1994, certain steps have been taken in 
terms of reparations for the indigenous peoples, although these have been limited 
in most cases to the form of mere recognition of indigenous property rights over 
ancestral lands. Th is has happened in Patagonia especially , where most cases of 
expropriation of indigenous lands occurred. In some cases even the restitution 
of indigenous lands, previously misappropriated by non-indigenous persons, has 
been ordered.⁴¹
As for Chile, the general picture resulting from this chapter is that of a country 
in arrears with regard to both the recognition and the aﬃ  rmation of indigenous 
rights. Unfortunately, at the moment the Chilean government shows no inten-
tion of adopting a diﬀ erent approach, and it persists in pursuing a policy in favour 
of non-indigenous interests, whether these are public private. However, signs of 
a counter tendency have recently come from some local courts (particularly with 
regard to the application of the Ley antiterrorismo to indigenous dissidents).⁴² 
Th is is perhaps a harbinger of change and it may prove signiﬁ cant as it is com-
ing from judges, who are the ones with the primary role in ensuring the concrete 
recognition, granting and safeguarding of individual and collective rights.
⁴⁰ cf FIDH, Informe. Chile. Posibilidades de cambio en la política hacia los pueblos indígenas, 
August 2006.
⁴¹ See para 1(c), above.
⁴² See para 2(b), above.
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